From Surveillance Capitalism to AI Imperialism | Chapter 01: Social networks as infrastructure for free data capture
Before AI could be marketed as a new intelligence order, social platforms had already built the behavioral raw material of that order. The FTC’s 2024 report on social media and video-streaming data practices gives this chapter its strongest regulatory anchor. Once social life is reorganized around measurable engagement, extractive targeting, and recommendation systems, platforms stop looking like passive infrastructure and start looking like privately governed civic systems.
Social networks as infrastructure for free data capture; surveillance capitalism; AI imperialism; Section 230 reform; evidence-based dossier
How does social networks as infrastructure for free data capture function within the dossier’s larger argument, and what does the documentary record allow this chapter to establish?
This paper examines social networks as infrastructure for free data capture within the broader dossier From Surveillance Capitalism to AI Imperialism. It is intentionally written to circulate on its own: necessary context is restated, evidence boundaries are made explicit, and cited material is reproduced in paper-local form rather than delegated to repo navigation. It contributes to the series as a paper that builds the structural case for refactoring Section 230 by documenting recommendation, extraction, and design power. Adjacent reinforcement appears in Chapter 02, Chapter 04, Chapter 10, but those cross-references are supportive rather than required for basic comprehension.
Before AI could be marketed as a new intelligence order, social platforms had already built the behavioral raw material of that order. Their core innovation was not simply communication at scale. It was the normalization of a business model in which attention, relationships, preferences, and expression became persistent, monetizable data assets. 1
This paper is derived from the chapter corpus for Chapter 01 and is grounded in the project’s structured research OS. It relies on source notes, extracted claims, entity profiles, and timeline events already normalized under the dossier’s evidence hierarchy. Documented facts are asserted directly where the record supports them; disputed matters are marked as such; interpretive claims are bounded explicitly; and speculative overreach is isolated in the evidence-boundary appendix.
This paper asks: How does social networks as infrastructure for free data capture function within the dossier’s larger argument, and what does the documentary record allow this chapter to establish? Its working answer is clear from the start: Before AI could be marketed as a new intelligence order, social platforms had already built the behavioral raw material of that order. Their core innovation was not simply communication at scale. It was the normalization of a business model in which attention, relationships, preferences, and expression became persistent, monetizable data assets. 2 The objective is not only to recount developments, but to show why the subject of this chapter belongs inside a structural argument about extraction, enclosure, legitimacy, and reform.
The FTC’s 2024 report on social media and video-streaming data practices gives this chapter its strongest regulatory anchor. The platform model is documented as one of extraction, retention, combination, and monetization, not as a neutral relay of user speech. That record is already enough to weaken the old fiction that sovereign-scale platforms are passive intermediaries. 3
The FTC’s 2019 Facebook action matters because Cambridge Analytica was not just a reputational scandal. It became a structural compliance event with board-level oversight duties and a formal federal record of deceptive and insufficiently controlled data governance. 4
Facebook’s own S-1 and later Meta proxy filings document
Peter Thiel as an early investor and a long-lived governance actor. That
does not prove clandestine command. It does prove continuity between
platform surveillance, elite venture governance, and later
state-adjacent technology networks. 5
Meta’s 2021 rebrand and 2023 10-K show that the company
attached a metaverse-centered strategic narrative to a still-dominant
advertising machine. The rebrand did not function as a data-governance
reset. It functioned as narrative redirection while the extraction
engine remained intact and financially central. 6
The documented platform record therefore shows more than large-scale surveillance. It shows social participation being routed through privately governed interfaces that could rank visibility, shape reach, and condition economic opportunity. Interpretation: this is the earlier precedent for the later AI story. Once an intermediary controls the interface layer, it can influence value without producing the underlying social life itself. 7
Interpretation: Chapter 01 begins the case for
Refactor Section 230 by showing that reach, design,
targeting, monetization, and recommendation are not incidental platform
features. They are the product. A sovereign-scale platform framework
should therefore track systemic design power rather than cling to
passive-hosting logic built for an earlier internet. 8
This paper sits inside a coordinated 11-paper architecture. Its nearest companions are Chapter 02 (Social erosion and moral reconfiguration), Chapter 04 (AI arrives when the human raw material already exists), Chapter 10 (What to do). In that series logic, Chapter 01 builds the structural case for refactoring Section 230 by documenting recommendation, extraction, and design power.
This chapter is strongest on surveillance business models, regulatory
intervention, governance continuity, and strategic redirection. It is
weaker on any maximal claim that every platform dataset was fully mapped
into every later foundation-model training stack. That bridge must be
built more carefully in Chapter 04. 9
This chapter is strongest on surveillance business models, regulatory
intervention, governance continuity, and strategic redirection. It is
weaker on any maximal claim that every platform dataset was fully mapped
into every later foundation-model training stack. That bridge must be
built more carefully in Chapter 04. 10
Once social life is reorganized around measurable engagement,
extractive targeting, and recommendation systems, platforms stop looking
like passive infrastructure and start looking like privately governed
civic systems. That is why the dossier’s Section 230
argument begins here: sovereign-scale platforms should be judged by the
harms and dependencies created by their design, amplification, and
monetization architecture. 11
Once social life is reorganized around measurable engagement, extractive targeting, and recommendation systems, platforms stop looking like passive infrastructure and start looking like privately governed civic systems. The next problem is not only that platforms captured behavior. In the architecture of this series, Chapter 01 therefore functions as a self-contained argument while also advancing the cumulative path toward the dossier’s three reforms.
This paper is designed to circulate independently. Public notes point readers to the real external documents first, then to the paper-local appendix entry that explains why each source matters.
The underlying research OS distinguishes among
Documented Fact, Disputed Fact,
Hypothesis / Interpretation, and
Speculative Narrative Risk. In Chapter 01, those boundaries
remain visible in the prose, in the bibliography, and in the appendix
sections that summarize claims and caution points.
ftc-2024-look-behind-screens. Relevance: That the platform
model relies on intensive extraction and processing of user data.ftc-facebook-privacy-2019. Relevance: That there is formal
regulatory backing for saying Facebook monetized and managed personal
data within a framework of deceptive practices and insufficient
oversight.facebook-s1-2012. Relevance: That Peter Thiel had a formal
governance role inside Facebook at the time of the IPO filing and that
the role dated back to 2005.meta-proxy-2022-thiel-retirement. Relevance: That Peter
Thiel’s formal role at Facebook / Meta lasted well beyond the early
startup period and remained active into 2022.meta-rebrand-2021. Relevance: That the rebrand was formally
tied to a metaverse-centered strategic narrative, not merely a cosmetic
name change.meta-2023-10k. Relevance: That the metaverse bet was not
just branding language; it had a dedicated segment and a continuing loss
structure visible in SEC reporting.Source citation: A
Look Behind the Screens: Examining the Data Practices of Social Media
and Video Streaming Services Institution / author:
FTC Date: n.d. Tier / type: T1 /
report Why it matters in this paper: That the platform
model relies on intensive extraction and processing of user data.
Corpus companion entry: Source S-063 Audit
ID: ftc-2024-look-behind-screens
Source citation: FTC
Imposes $5 Billion Penalty and Sweeping New Privacy Restrictions on
Facebook Institution / author: FTC
Date: 2019-07-24 Tier / type: T1 /
press_release Why it matters in this paper: That there
is formal regulatory backing for saying Facebook monetized and managed
personal data within a framework of deceptive practices and insufficient
oversight. Corpus companion entry: Source S-064
Audit ID: ftc-facebook-privacy-2019
Source citation: Facebook,
Inc. Registration Statement on Form S-1 Institution /
author: SEC Date: 2012-02-01 Tier /
type: T1 / filing Why it matters in this
paper: That Peter Thiel had a formal governance role inside
Facebook at the time of the IPO filing and that the role dated back to
2005. Corpus companion entry: Source S-052
Audit ID: facebook-s1-2012
Source citation: Meta
Platforms, Inc. 2022 Definitive Proxy Statement Institution
/ author: SEC Date: 2022-04-08 Tier /
type: T1 / proxy_statement Why it matters in this
paper: That Peter Thiel’s formal role at Facebook / Meta lasted
well beyond the early startup period and remained active into 2022.
Corpus companion entry: Source S-080 Audit
ID: meta-proxy-2022-thiel-retirement
Source citation: The
Facebook Company Is Now Meta Institution / author:
Meta Date: 2021-10-28 Tier / type: T1
/ company_statement Why it matters in this paper: That
the rebrand was formally tied to a metaverse-centered strategic
narrative, not merely a cosmetic name change. Corpus companion
entry: Source S-081 Audit ID:
meta-rebrand-2021
Source citation: Meta
Platforms, Inc. 2023 Annual Report (Form 10-K) Institution /
author: U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
Date: 2024-02-02 Tier / type: T1 /
sec_filing Why it matters in this paper: That the
metaverse bet was not just branding language; it had a dedicated segment
and a continuing loss structure visible in SEC reporting. Corpus
companion entry: Source S-079 Audit ID:
meta-2023-10k
Claim statement: That Peter Thiel had a formal
governance role inside Facebook at the time of the IPO filing and that
the role dated back to 2005. Evidence status:
Documented Fact Source support: Appendix
A3 Corpus companion entry: Claim C-156
Audit Claim ID:
facebook-s1-2012-01-surveillance-capitalism-claim-01
Claim statement: That Facebook itself described
Thiel not merely as a commentator or associate, but as an early investor
and standing director. Evidence status: Documented Fact
Source support: Appendix
A3 Corpus companion entry: Claim C-157
Audit Claim ID:
facebook-s1-2012-01-surveillance-capitalism-claim-02
Claim statement: That Thiel occupied a structurally
meaningful position in Facebook’s governance architecture, including a
preferred-stock-designated seat and an audit-committee role.
Evidence status: Documented Fact Source
support: Appendix
A3 Corpus companion entry: Claim C-158
Audit Claim ID:
facebook-s1-2012-01-surveillance-capitalism-claim-03
Claim statement: That Facebook’s public-market
transition preserved concentrated internal control over directors and
corporate decisions. Evidence status: Documented Fact
Source support: Appendix
A3 Corpus companion entry: Claim C-159
Audit Claim ID:
facebook-s1-2012-01-surveillance-capitalism-claim-04
Claim statement: That Peter Thiel had a formal
governance role inside Facebook at the time of the IPO filing and that
the role dated back to 2005. Evidence status:
Documented Fact Source support: Appendix
A3 Corpus companion entry: Claim C-160
Audit Claim ID:
facebook-s1-2012-11-facebook-thiel-intelligence-adjacency-claim-01
Claim statement: That Facebook itself described
Thiel not merely as a commentator or associate, but as an early investor
and standing director. Evidence status: Documented Fact
Source support: Appendix
A3 Corpus companion entry: Claim C-161
Audit Claim ID:
facebook-s1-2012-11-facebook-thiel-intelligence-adjacency-claim-02
Claim statement: That Thiel occupied a structurally
meaningful position in Facebook’s governance architecture, including a
preferred-stock-designated seat and an audit-committee role.
Evidence status: Documented Fact Source
support: Appendix
A3 Corpus companion entry: Claim C-162
Audit Claim ID:
facebook-s1-2012-11-facebook-thiel-intelligence-adjacency-claim-03
Claim statement: That Facebook’s public-market
transition preserved concentrated internal control over directors and
corporate decisions. Evidence status: Documented Fact
Source support: Appendix
A3 Corpus companion entry: Claim C-163
Audit Claim ID:
facebook-s1-2012-11-facebook-thiel-intelligence-adjacency-claim-04
Claim statement: That the platform model relies on
intensive extraction and processing of user data. Evidence
status: Documented Fact Source support: Appendix
A1 Corpus companion entry: Claim C-196
Audit Claim ID:
ftc-2024-look-behind-screens-claim-01
Claim statement: That platforms cannot seriously be
described as simple passive intermediaries. Evidence
status: Documented Fact Source support: Appendix
A1 Corpus companion entry: Claim C-197
Audit Claim ID:
ftc-2024-look-behind-screens-claim-02
Claim statement: That there is regulatory support
for speaking of commercial surveillance at massive scale.
Evidence status: Documented Fact Source
support: Appendix
A1 Corpus companion entry: Claim C-198
Audit Claim ID:
ftc-2024-look-behind-screens-claim-03
Claim statement: That there is formal regulatory
backing for saying Facebook monetized and managed personal data within a
framework of deceptive practices and insufficient oversight.
Evidence status: Documented Fact Source
support: Appendix
A2 Corpus companion entry: Claim C-199
Audit Claim ID:
ftc-facebook-privacy-2019-01-surveillance-capitalism-claim-01
Claim statement: That the Cambridge Analytica
scandal was not only a media episode, but a point of institutional
intervention with structural compliance consequences. Evidence
status: Documented Fact Source support: Appendix
A2 Corpus companion entry: Claim C-200
Audit Claim ID:
ftc-facebook-privacy-2019-01-surveillance-capitalism-claim-02
Claim statement: That Facebook’s
commercial-surveillance architecture generated enough risk to require
extraordinary board-level oversight mechanisms. Evidence
status: Documented Fact Source support: Appendix
A2 Corpus companion entry: Claim C-201
Audit Claim ID:
ftc-facebook-privacy-2019-01-surveillance-capitalism-claim-03
Claim statement: That there is formal regulatory
backing for saying Facebook monetized and managed personal data within a
framework of deceptive practices and insufficient oversight.
Evidence status: Documented Fact Source
support: Appendix
A2 Corpus companion entry: Claim C-202
Audit Claim ID:
ftc-facebook-privacy-2019-claim-01
Claim statement: That the Cambridge Analytica
scandal was not only a media episode, but a point of institutional
intervention with structural compliance consequences. Evidence
status: Documented Fact Source support: Appendix
A2 Corpus companion entry: Claim C-203
Audit Claim ID:
ftc-facebook-privacy-2019-claim-02
Claim statement: That Facebook’s
commercial-surveillance architecture generated enough risk to require
extraordinary board-level oversight mechanisms. Evidence
status: Documented Fact Source support: Appendix
A2 Corpus companion entry: Claim C-204
Audit Claim ID:
ftc-facebook-privacy-2019-claim-03
Claim statement: That the metaverse bet was not just
branding language; it had a dedicated segment and a continuing loss
structure visible in SEC reporting. Evidence status:
Documented Fact Source support: Appendix
A6 Corpus companion entry: Claim C-252
Audit Claim ID:
meta-2023-10k-01-surveillance-capitalism-claim-01
Claim statement: That Meta’s core economic engine
remained advertising, even while management invested heavily in AI and
immersive technologies. Evidence status: Documented
Fact Source support: Appendix
A6 Corpus companion entry: Claim C-253
Audit Claim ID:
meta-2023-10k-01-surveillance-capitalism-claim-02
Claim statement: That the rebrand period can be
discussed in material financial terms rather than only as a symbolic
communications move. Evidence status: Documented Fact
Source support: Appendix
A6 Corpus companion entry: Claim C-254
Audit Claim ID:
meta-2023-10k-01-surveillance-capitalism-claim-03
Claim statement: That the metaverse bet was not just
branding language; it had a dedicated segment and a continuing loss
structure visible in SEC reporting. Evidence status:
Documented Fact Source support: Appendix
A6 Corpus companion entry: Claim C-255
Audit Claim ID: meta-2023-10k-claim-01
Claim statement: That Meta’s core economic engine
remained advertising, even while management invested heavily in AI and
immersive technologies. Evidence status: Documented
Fact Source support: Appendix
A6 Corpus companion entry: Claim C-256
Audit Claim ID: meta-2023-10k-claim-02
Claim statement: That the rebrand period can be
discussed in material financial terms rather than only as a symbolic
communications move. Evidence status: Documented Fact
Source support: Appendix
A6 Corpus companion entry: Claim C-257
Audit Claim ID: meta-2023-10k-claim-03
Claim statement: That Peter Thiel’s formal role at
Facebook / Meta lasted well beyond the early startup period and remained
active into 2022. Evidence status: Documented Fact
Source support: Appendix
A4 Corpus companion entry: Claim C-258
Audit Claim ID:
meta-proxy-2022-thiel-retirement-01-surveillance-capitalism-claim-01
Claim statement: That the company itself presented
Thiel’s board tenure as spanning from 2005 to the end of his term at the
2022 annual meeting. Evidence status: Documented Fact
Source support: Appendix
A4 Corpus companion entry: Claim C-259
Audit Claim ID:
meta-proxy-2022-thiel-retirement-01-surveillance-capitalism-claim-02
Claim statement: That Thiel still held
committee-level governance authority at Meta immediately before his
departure from the board. Evidence status: Documented
Fact Source support: Appendix
A4 Corpus companion entry: Claim C-260
Audit Claim ID:
meta-proxy-2022-thiel-retirement-01-surveillance-capitalism-claim-03
Claim statement: That continuity between the
Facebook surveillance era and the Meta rebrand era included continuity
in elite board membership. Evidence status: Documented
Fact Source support: Appendix
A4 Corpus companion entry: Claim C-261
Audit Claim ID:
meta-proxy-2022-thiel-retirement-01-surveillance-capitalism-claim-04
Claim statement: That Peter Thiel’s formal role at
Facebook / Meta lasted well beyond the early startup period and remained
active into 2022. Evidence status: Documented Fact
Source support: Appendix
A4 Corpus companion entry: Claim C-262
Audit Claim ID:
meta-proxy-2022-thiel-retirement-11-facebook-thiel-intelligence-adjacency-claim-01
Claim statement: That the company itself presented
Thiel’s board tenure as spanning from 2005 to the end of his term at the
2022 annual meeting. Evidence status: Documented Fact
Source support: Appendix
A4 Corpus companion entry: Claim C-263
Audit Claim ID:
meta-proxy-2022-thiel-retirement-11-facebook-thiel-intelligence-adjacency-claim-02
Claim statement: That Thiel still held
committee-level governance authority at Meta immediately before his
departure from the board. Evidence status: Documented
Fact Source support: Appendix
A4 Corpus companion entry: Claim C-264
Audit Claim ID:
meta-proxy-2022-thiel-retirement-11-facebook-thiel-intelligence-adjacency-claim-03
Claim statement: That continuity between the
Facebook surveillance era and the Meta rebrand era included continuity
in elite board membership. Evidence status: Documented
Fact Source support: Appendix
A4 Corpus companion entry: Claim C-265
Audit Claim ID:
meta-proxy-2022-thiel-retirement-11-facebook-thiel-intelligence-adjacency-claim-04
Claim statement: That the rebrand was formally tied
to a metaverse-centered strategic narrative, not merely a cosmetic name
change. Evidence status: Documented Fact Source
support: Appendix A5
Corpus companion entry: Claim C-266 Audit Claim
ID:
meta-rebrand-2021-01-surveillance-capitalism-claim-01
Claim statement: That Meta itself created a
reporting split capable of distinguishing its mature platform business
from its speculative immersive-technology investment. Evidence
status: Documented Fact Source support: Appendix A5
Corpus companion entry: Claim C-267 Audit Claim
ID:
meta-rebrand-2021-01-surveillance-capitalism-claim-02
Claim statement: That the company did not present
the rebrand as a data-governance reset. Evidence
status: Documented Fact Source support: Appendix A5
Corpus companion entry: Claim C-268 Audit Claim
ID:
meta-rebrand-2021-01-surveillance-capitalism-claim-03
Claim statement: That the rebrand was formally tied
to a metaverse-centered strategic narrative, not merely a cosmetic name
change. Evidence status: Documented Fact Source
support: Appendix A5
Corpus companion entry: Claim C-269 Audit Claim
ID: meta-rebrand-2021-claim-01
Claim statement: That Meta itself created a
reporting split capable of distinguishing its mature platform business
from its speculative immersive-technology investment. Evidence
status: Documented Fact Source support: Appendix A5
Corpus companion entry: Claim C-270 Audit Claim
ID: meta-rebrand-2021-claim-02
Claim statement: That the company did not present
the rebrand as a data-governance reset. Evidence
status: Documented Fact Source support: Appendix A5
Corpus companion entry: Claim C-271 Audit Claim
ID: meta-rebrand-2021-claim-03
Claim statement: That sovereign-scale platforms
should be regulated on the basis of design, amplification, targeting,
monetization, moderation architecture, and systemic reach rather than
passive-hosting logic. Evidence status: Hypothesis /
Interpretation Source support: Appendix
A1, Appendix
A6 Corpus companion entry: Claim C-418
Audit Claim ID:
vector01-section230-sovereign-scale-reform-claim-01
Claim statement: That the
Facebook-Thiel-Palantir-In-Q-Tel record supports a bounded argument
about networked governance continuity between surveillance platforms,
venture capital, and security-state technology ecosystems.
Evidence status: Hypothesis / Interpretation
Source support: Appendix
A3, Appendix
A4 Corpus companion entry: Claim C-459
Audit Claim ID:
vector11-networked-adjacency-synthesis-claim-01
Claim statement: That the strongest reading of the
Facebook-Thiel-Palantir-In-Q-Tel record is a structured adjacency model
built through board power, venture sponsorship, and government
contracting rather than evidence of covert command. Evidence
status: Hypothesis / Interpretation Source
support: Appendix
A3, Appendix
A4 Corpus companion entry: Claim C-461
Audit Claim ID:
vector11-structured-adjacency-not-command-claim-01
Claim statement: That the Meta rebrand and metaverse
cycle can be read as a narrative and capital-allocation redirection
after a reputational-regulatory rupture, even if the precise intent
behind the timing cannot be proved conclusively. Evidence
status: Hypothesis / Interpretation Source
support: Appendix
A2, Appendix
A5, Appendix
A6 Corpus companion entry: Claim C-463
Audit Claim ID:
vector12-rebrand-redirection-synthesis-claim-01
Claim statement: That refactoring Section 230 for
sovereign-scale platforms requires treating platforms as ordinary
publishers for every user utterance regardless of design, amplification,
targeting, or monetization. Evidence status:
Speculative Narrative Risk Source support: Appendix
A1 Corpus companion entry: Claim C-417
Audit Claim ID:
vector01-publisher-liability-overclaim-claim-01
Claim statement: That intelligence adjacency or
early-investor overlap alone proves direct CIA control of Facebook.
Evidence status: Speculative Narrative Risk
Source support: Appendix
A3 Corpus companion entry: Claim C-458
Audit Claim ID:
vector11-direct-cia-control-facebook-overclaim-claim-01
Claim statement: That the Meta rebrand by itself
proves a singular covert intent to erase Cambridge Analytica from public
memory or that the metaverse pivot was primarily a cover-up operation.
Evidence status: Speculative Narrative Risk
Source support: Appendix
A2, Appendix
A5 Corpus companion entry: Claim C-462
Audit Claim ID:
vector12-coverup-intent-overclaim-claim-01
Event summary: Facebook’s S-1 publicly documents
Peter Thiel’s board seat and early-investor role Event
date: 2012-02-01 Source support: Appendix
A3 Corpus companion entry: Event T-002
Audit Event ID:
event-facebook-s1-thiel-2012-02-01
Event summary: The FTC imposes a record penalty and
new privacy restrictions on Facebook Event date:
2019-07-24 Source support: Appendix
A2 Corpus companion entry: Event T-006
Audit Event ID:
event-ftc-facebook-2019-07-24
Event summary: Facebook formally rebrands its parent
company as Meta Event date: 2021-10-28 Source
support: Appendix A5
Corpus companion entry: Event T-015 Audit Event
ID: event-meta-rebrand-2021-10-28
Event summary: Meta’s proxy states that Peter Thiel
will retire from the board after the annual meeting Event
date: 2022-04-08 Source support: Appendix
A4 Corpus companion entry: Event T-017
Audit Event ID:
event-meta-proxy-thiel-retirement-2022-04-08
Event summary: Meta files its 2023 annual report
with continued Reality Labs losses Event date:
2024-02-02 Source support: Appendix
A6 Corpus companion entry: Event T-040
Audit Event ID:
event-meta-10k-2024-02-02
Entity type: business_unit Role in this
paper: Actor relevant to
12_cambridge_analytica_meta_metaverse_rebrand,
05_talent_hoarding_section174_layoffs. Relevant sources in this
paper: Appendix A5, Appendix
A6 Corpus companion entry: Entity E-031
Audit Entity ID: org-reality-labs
Entity type: company Role in this
paper: Actor relevant to 01_surveillance_capitalism,
03_covid_acceleration_and_geopolitics,
04_data_to_models_copyright_weights,
11_facebook_thiel_intelligence_adjacency and others. Relevant
sources in this paper: Appendix
A2, Appendix
A3, Appendix
A4, Appendix
A5 Corpus companion entry: Entity E-015
Audit Entity ID: org-facebook
Entity type: person Role in this
paper: Actor relevant to 05_talent_hoarding_section174_layoffs,
08_power_networks_legitimacy_capture, 09_future_if_unchecked,
12_cambridge_analytica_meta_metaverse_rebrand. Relevant sources
in this paper: Appendix A5
Corpus companion entry: Entity E-054 Audit
Entity ID: person-mark-zuckerberg
Entity type: person Role in this
paper: Actor relevant to 01_surveillance_capitalism,
08_power_networks_legitimacy_capture, 09_future_if_unchecked,
11_facebook_thiel_intelligence_adjacency. Relevant sources in
this paper: Appendix
A3, Appendix
A4 Corpus companion entry: Entity E-058
Audit Entity ID: person-peter-thiel
Entity type: regulator Role in this
paper: Actor relevant to 01_surveillance_capitalism.
Relevant sources in this paper: Appendix
A1, Appendix
A2 Corpus companion entry: Entity E-017
Audit Entity ID: org-ftc
Sources: FTC, A Look Behind the Screens: Examining… (n.d.; see Appendix A1); FTC, FTC Imposes $5 Billion Penalty and Sw… (2019-07-24; see Appendix A2)↩︎
Sources: FTC, A Look Behind the Screens: Examining… (n.d.; see Appendix A1); FTC, FTC Imposes $5 Billion Penalty and Sw… (2019-07-24; see Appendix A2)↩︎
Sources: FTC, A Look Behind the Screens: Examining… (n.d.; see Appendix A1)↩︎
Sources: FTC, FTC Imposes $5 Billion Penalty and Sw… (2019-07-24; see Appendix A2)↩︎
Sources: SEC, Facebook, Inc. Registration Statement… (2012-02-01; see Appendix A3); SEC, Meta Platforms, Inc. 2022 Definitive… (2022-04-08; see Appendix A4)↩︎
Sources: Meta, The Facebook Company Is Now Meta (2021-10-28; see Appendix A5); U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Meta Platforms, Inc. 2023 Annual Repo… (2024-02-02; see Appendix A6)↩︎
Sources: FTC, A Look Behind the Screens: Examining… (n.d.; see Appendix A1); FTC, FTC Imposes $5 Billion Penalty and Sw… (2019-07-24; see Appendix A2); U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Meta Platforms, Inc. 2023 Annual Repo… (2024-02-02; see Appendix A6)↩︎
Sources: FTC, A Look Behind the Screens: Examining… (n.d.; see Appendix A1); FTC, FTC Imposes $5 Billion Penalty and Sw… (2019-07-24; see Appendix A2); U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Meta Platforms, Inc. 2023 Annual Repo… (2024-02-02; see Appendix A6)↩︎
Sources: FTC, A Look Behind the Screens: Examining… (n.d.; see Appendix A1); U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Meta Platforms, Inc. 2023 Annual Repo… (2024-02-02; see Appendix A6)↩︎
Sources: FTC, A Look Behind the Screens: Examining… (n.d.; see Appendix A1); U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Meta Platforms, Inc. 2023 Annual Repo… (2024-02-02; see Appendix A6)↩︎
Sources: FTC, A Look Behind the Screens: Examining… (n.d.; see Appendix A1); FTC, FTC Imposes $5 Billion Penalty and Sw… (2019-07-24; see Appendix A2)↩︎